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STATEMENT OF PARTIES TO THIS ACTION
The parties to this action are Plaintiff-Appellant
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Wagner Associates dba Grabber Utah, Defendant-Appellee Hercules,
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and Defendant Modulaire

Industries was

prior to the trial of the case and, therefore,

Defendant Modulaire is not involved in this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to an Order of transfer
dated January 10, 1989 from the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.

The Utah Supreme Court had Jurisdiction of this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j ).
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from an Order based upon a Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee Hercules under which
Plaintiff-Appellant's

mechanic's

lien cause

of

action was

dismissed and an appeal from a final Judgement following trial
under which Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action for failure to
obtain a payment bond was dismissed.

The Order and final Judgment

were both issued by the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this appeal are stated as follows:
a.

Whether the trial court committed an error of law when it

ruled that the alienability of an interest in real property
affects the validity or enforceability of a mechanic's lien filed
against that interest pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et
seq. (1953 as amended); and
b.

Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that modular

office complexes of the configuration and magnitude of those which
were constructed for Defendant Hercules do not require the project
owner to obtain a payment bond in connection with the work

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended prior to
1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are three statutes set forth in the Addendum hereto.
First, is Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in
1985); Second, is Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as
amended in 1987); and Third, is Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953
as amended in 1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of the Plaintiff-Appellant supplying
construction materials

for the construction of approximately

25,000 square feet of office space in two complexes for DefendantAppellee Hercules.

Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Lien

against the subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder
pursuant
amended).

to Utah Code Annotated

§ 38-1-1 et seq.

(1953 as

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action for breach of

a joint-check agreement against Defendant Modulaire, for failure
to obtain a payment bond as required by Utah Code Annotated § 142-1 et seq. (1953 as amended prior to 1986) against DefendantAppellee Hercules, and for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien.
The parties submitted various motions for summary judgment
and memorandums in support thereof.

The court below ruled that

there were material issues of fact preventing the granting of
summary judgment on all motions for summary judgment except on
Plaintiff-Appellantfs

and Defendant-Appellee Hercules' motions

6

relating to Plaintiff-Appellantfs mechanic's lien foreclosure
cause of action.
Following hearings on the motions for summary judgment, the
trial court dismissed Plaintiff-Appellantfs mechanic's lien cause
of action.

The trial court ruled that the interest of Defendant-

Appellee Hercules in the subject property was not alienable and,
therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien could not attach
thereto.
Prior to trial, Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant Modulaire
entered into a settlement agreement resolving all causes of action
between Plaintiff and Defendant Modulaire.

Thus, the only cause

of action remaining at trial was for failure to obtain a payment
bond against Defendant-Appellee Hercules pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended prior to 1986).
At the end of trial, the trial judge ruled from the bench and
dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to obtain a payment bond
cause of action based upon the court's legal conclusion that the
office complexes were not affixed to the subject property.
Defendant-Appellee

Hercules

prepared

conclusions of law and a final judgment.

findings

of

fact

and

Plaintiff-Appellee filed

objections based, in part, upon the exclusion of undisputed facts
which should have been and were in fact part of the factual
analysis upon which the trial court based its legal conclusions.
Despite these objections by Plaintiff-Appellant to the findings of
fact and conclusions of law and to the final judgment, the court
signed and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
7

the final judgment in substantially the same form as prepared by
Defendant-Appellee Hercules.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This action arises out of the

supplying

construction

materials

for

Plaintiff-Appellant

the

construction

of

approximately 25,000 square feet of office space in two complexes
for Defendant-Appellee Hercules.

Trial Transcript —

R. at 640,

pp. 50 & 51.
2.

The office space was constructed with 30 modular office

units, 14 feet by 60 feet each.

One complex contains 19 units,

Annex 15, and the other complex contains 11 units, Annex 16.
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 —
3.

R. at 217.

The complexes were constructed on land situated in

western Salt Lake County which is used by Defendant-Appellee
Hercules under an agreement between Defendant-Appellee Hercules
and the United States Navy.
4.

Trial Exhibit 68D.

The subject property comprises part of Defendant-Appellee

Hercules' Bacchus Works operation.

Affidavit of Ryder Christian

Waring, Exhibit 2 — R . at 247.
5.

Defendant-Appellee Hercules contracted with Defendant

Modulaire for the construction and supply of the modular office
units.

R. at 217 and Trial Transcript at p. 7.

6.

Space

Building

Systems

contracted

with

Defendant

Modulaire to perform the interior finish and other work on the
project.

R. at 226 and Trial Transcript at p. 7.
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7.

Space Building Systems has since been granted protection

under the Unites States Bankruptcy laws.
8.

Plaintiff-Appellant supplied drywall and other interior

finish materials to the project pursuant to a contract between
Plaintiff-Appellant and Space Building Systems.

Trial Transcript

at p. 7.
9.

Plaintiff-Appellant was not paid by Space Building

Systems in full for the materials it furnished to the project.
Trial Transcript at pp. 11-13.
10.

Plaintiff-Appellant

made demand

for payment

from

Defendants and upon refusal of the Defendants to make payment for
the materials, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lien against the
subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
Lien Attached to Complaint —
12.
entered

Notice of

R. at 15.

On or about June 7, 1985, Defendant-Appellee Hercules
into

a contract

with Defendant

Modulaire

for the

construction of certain office complexes on property located
approximately

at 4100 South 8400 West.

Affidavit of Ryder

Christian Waring, Exhibit 2 -- R. at 247.
13.

On or

about

July

3,

1985, Modulaire

entered a

subcontract with Space Building Systems wherein Space Building
Systems was to provide labor and materials in the construction and
improvement of the office complexes and more particularly to
"complete interior rough & finish walls & ceiling complete."

9

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Cover Sheet and Article 1.
1 —

R. at 226.
14.

From July 8, 1985, through September 26, 1985, John

Wagner Associates d/b/a Grabber Utah (hereinafter "Grabber Utah")
sold certain supplies and materials to Space Building Systems,
which were installed, integrated and incorporated into the office
complexes.

Trial Transcript, Testimony of Robert Spencer, Ben

Gabladon and Larry Bills.
15.

On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed for

relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
16.

The amount owing Grabber Utah for supplies and materials

sold to Space Building Systems and incorporated into the Offices
is $14,300.03, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees,
less application of an undetermined principal payment which was
part of a settlement between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendant
Modulaire.
17.

Trial Transcript at p. 13.

On December 5, 1985, Plaintiff recorded a Notice of Lien

with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 4172790,
Book 5715, Page 1421.
Exhibit B —
18.

Notice of Lien Attached to Complaint,

R. at 15.

The construction contract between Space Building and

Modulaire is an Associated General Contractors of America Standard
Subcontract Agreement

for Building Construction

(hereinafter

"subcontract"), with Modulairefs name and logo attached to the
title page, signed as subcontractor and contractor, respectively.
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Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Subcontract Cover Sheet and
pp.

1, 7 —
19.

R. at 226.

The subcontract encompassed complete "electrical rough &

finish interior."
1.1 —

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, section

R. at 226.

20.

The subcontract entitled Modulaire to lien waivers from

Space Building, allowed deduction of payments to Space Building
from Modulaire due to any claim of lien, required Space Building
to keep the building reasonably clean from debris, permitted
Modulaire to require a performance bond and labor and material
payment bond, and stated that any disputes arising from the
subcontract shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the
Construction

Industry

Arbitration Association.

Arbitration

Rules

of

the

American

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4,

articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 3.6, 6 and 10.1 (Emphasis Supplied) -- R.
at 226.
21.

The Purchase Order between Modulaire and Hercules for

procurement of the office complexes refers to them as "complexes"
and "office complexes."
pp. 1, 4 —
22.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3,

R. at 217.
The Purchase Order states that Hercules is "responsible

for site preparation, sewer, water and electrical service hookups. " Id-- at 2.
23.

The Purchase Order states that Modulaire is responsible

for any repair or maintenance
complex." _Id. at 4.
11

in the

"shell of the office

24.

The tenor of Specification No. 9106 is that of the

construction of a building or structure rather than a mobile unit.
Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 1 —
25.

R. at 240.

Modulaire' s Manufacturer's Statement of Origin to a

Motor Vehicle

refers to the Offices

as a building:

"The

Corporation certifies that this was the first transfer of such new
Modular building. . . . "

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 1

(Emphasis Supplied) -- R. at 172.
26.

The Purchase Order, which specifies the lease terms,

contains a recapture provision wherein Hercules is allowed to buy
the Office complex with 50% of previously made lease payments
going toward the purchase price.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach,

Exhibit 3, pp. 3-4 — 217.
27.

The Purchase Order provides Hercules with an option to

extend the leases beyond the initial two year period with the
extended lease rate in no case to be higher than the present
monthly rates.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, pp. 1, 3 —

R. at 217.
28.

The Purchase Order provides for a certain dismantling

cost if and when necessary.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit

3, p. 1 (Emphasis Supplied) -- R. at 217.
29.

Complete water, sewer, telephone and electrical lines

have been constructed and affixed to the office complexes; the
wheels and hitches are removed; concrete sidewalks and stairs with
steel railings lead to the office complexes; grading was performed
in preparation for the office complexes; significant amounts of
12

asphalt were placed to create extensive parking areas with the
asphalt fitting snugly within the serrated

skirting and extending

halfway up the skirting in certain areas; several units are joined
to form expansive office complexes; Annex 15 is "L" shaped, joined
by an enclosed, suspended walkway; Annex 16 is terraced and joined
by interior stairwells; rain gutters and air conditioning units
are attached; the interior is completely finished with carpet and
drywall overlapping the joints of the connected, prefabricated
shells; the office complexes, costing nearly one half million
dollars, rest on a permanent foundation of cinder block; and the
proposal for expansion of the parking lot for Annex 16 refers to
the annex as "Building."

Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux; Exhibit "1"-

- R. at 405.
30.

The subcontract refers to Hercules as the Owner.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, subcontract Cover Sheet—
R. at 226.
31.

Hercules states that it manages the property pursuant to

an agreement with the United States Navy.

Affidavit of Ryder

Christian Waring, para. 6 (Emphasis Supplied) —
32.

R. at 168.

Hercules states that it uses the property pursuant to a

contract with the Government of the United States.

Hercules'

Answer to Complaint, para. 7 -- R. at 23.
33.

The contract with the United States Government grants

Hercules wide-ranging use and control of all the "facilities" (the
term "facilities" under said contract means "all property provided
under

the contract").

The property
13

is occupied

with the

Government's permission, and Hercules' interest is subordinate to
the Government's interest.

Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring,

Exhibit 2, General Provisions For Facilities Use Contracts, Clause
Numbers 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 29 —
34.

R. at 247.

Hercules initially spent approximately one half million

dollars for the office complexes.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
With

regard

to the dismissal

of

Plaintiff-Appellant's

mechanic's lien cause of action on summary judgment, the trial
court erred in two respects in ruling that Plaintiff-Appellant's
mechanic's lien could not attach to the interest of DefendantAppellee Hercules in and to the subject property.

First, there is

nothing in the Facilities Use Agreement between Defendant-Appellee
Hercules and the United States Government which is an absolute bar
to the alienability of Hercules interest in the property.

In

fact, the Facilities Use Agreement contemplates the possibility of
such liens.

Second, there is nothing in the mechanic's lien

statute which requires that an interest in real property must be
alienable in order for a mechanic's lien to attach.
With respect to the dismissal of

Plaintiff-Appellant's

failure to obtain a payment bond cause of action, the trial court
erred in ruling that the office complexes were personal property
which were not affixed to the subject real property.

Based upon

the full facts and circumstance presented to the trial court, the
correct

legal

conclusion

is that

14

the office

complexes

do

constitute "construction, addition to, alteration or repair of any
building, structure or improvement."
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
This argument addresses two primary issues.

First, the

alienability of Defendant-Appellee Hercules' interest in and to
the subject property does not affect whether a mechanic's lien can
attach to such interest.

And second, the facts presented to the

trial court do not support the legal conclusion that the office
complexes are personal property which has not become affixed to
the real property.

In the alternative, such facts show that the

traditional test of fixtures v. personal property cannot apply in
the case at bar and still give effect to the clear legislative
intent with regard to mechanic's lien and payment bond claims.
Since the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes are in
para materia and since this appeal involves both mechanic's lien
and payment bond matters, the issues will be discussed in terms of
both statutes.

Adjudications of payment bond statutes are helpful

in determining

mechanic's

lien issues and adjudications of

mechanic's lien statutes are helpful in determining payment bond
issues liens.

King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17,

19, (Utah 1968).
Utah Code Annotated

§ 14-2-1

(1953 as amended in 1985)

states, in pertinent part:
The owner of any interest in land entering
into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for
the construction, addition to, alteration, or
15

repair of any building, structure or
improvement upon land shall, before any such
work is commenced, , obtain from the
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
contract price, with good and sufficient
sureties, conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment
for material furnished, equipment and
materials rented, and labor performed under
the contract.
Utah Code Annotated

§ 38-1-3

(1953 as amended in 1981)

states, in pertinent part:
Contractors, Subcontractors and all persons
performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in the
construction, alteration, or improvement of
any building, structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner . . «, shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which the
they have rendered service, performed labor or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor
performed or material or equipment furnished
or rented by each respectively . . . . Such
liens shall attach to only such interest as
the owner may have in the property. . . .
II.

THE ALIENABILITY OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT
AFFECT THE ATTACHMENT OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN TO THAT INTEREST

1.

There is Nothing in the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statutes or in
the Cases Interpreting such Statutes Which Require Alienability of an Interest in Real Property as a Precondition to
Attachment of a Mechanic's Lien.
Since Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien cause of action

was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, the standard of
review is that all facts and reasonable inferences of proof are to
be decided in a light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gadd

v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry
Kiln Company, 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962).

16

The court below ruled that Defendant-Appellee Hercules'
interest in the property is not alienable and held that in such a
situation, a mechanic's lien could not attach to that interest.
The ruling that Defendant-Appellee

Hercules interest is not

alienable is not supported by the evidence presented to the trial
court at the motion for summary judgment.

For example, the

agreement between Defendant-Appellee Hercules contains a promise
by Hercules to keep the property free from all liens, thus,
anticipating to possibility of encumbrances.
Ryder

Christian Waring, Exhibit

2, General

See Affidavit of
Provisions

Facilities Use Contract, Paragraph 8 -- R. at 275.

for

Also as an

example, Defendant-Appellee Hercules is not only allowed to use to
subject property without payment therefor in the performance of
government contracting work, it is also authorized to use the
property for any other purpose and as long as Defendant-Appellee
Hercules pays the appropriate monetary rental therefor.

See

Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 2, General Provisions
for Facilities Use Contract, Paragraph 2 -- R. at 270.
From a reading of the entire Facilities Use Agreement, it is
clear that there is no absolute bar to alienability of Hercules'
interest.

Defendant-Appellee Hercules asserted, and apparently

the trial court believed, that a transfer of the property would
result

in an automatic

Agreement.

termination

of the

Facilities

Use

However, it appears to be within the discretion of the

United States Government whether to terminate the Agreement upon
such an occurrence.
17

Furthermore, to allow the trial court's "alienability" ruling
to stand would contravene the clear purpose of the mechanic's lien
and payment bond statutes and encourage owners of property to
structure their dealings in such a way as to avoid the applicability of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes.
The purpose of Utah mechanic's lien statute is to provide
protection to those who enhance the value of property by supplying
labor or materials.

Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648

P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982).

The statute is liberally and broadly

construed to effect this desired objective.

Id.; AAA Fencing Co.

v. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986).
In its memoranda and at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, Defendant-Appellee Hercules argued that it has no legal
interest in the real property, although it did admit that a
Facilities Use Agreement

exists between

Hercules and the United States Navy.

Defendant-Appellee

The trial court found that

Hercules did have some interest in the property but ruled that
such interest was not alienable.
And, while Defendant-Appellee Hercules nor the trial court do
not term Hercules interest in the subject land as a lease under
the Facilities Use Agreement, the law clearly does.

A valid lease

exists when there is (1) a binding contract in compliance with the
statute of frauds; (2) possession by the tenant; (3) legal title
in the landlord; and (4) a leasehold that is capable of being
granted.
(1978).

Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66
All of these elements for a lease are satisfied in the
18

present

case.

If Hercules

interest

is indeed

a lease, a

mechanic's lien can attach thereto.
Utah law permits a mechanic's lien to attach to interests
less than fee simple, such as an equitable interest, a leasehold
estate, and a building separate from the soil upon which it was
erected.

King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 19

(Utah 1968); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382
(Utah 1982); See also Basic Refactories, Inc. v. Bright, 298 P.2d
810 (Nev. 1956) (mechanic's lien valid though United State became
lessor upon completion of construction).

Accordingly, Defendant-

Appellee Hercules enjoys sufficient leasehold, or other, interest
in the property to permit attachment of a mechanic's lien.
Furthermore, the alienability of such interest does not, as a
matter of law, affect the attachment of Plaintiff-Appellant's
mechanic's lien.

The mechanic's lien statute simply states that

"Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may
have in the property . . . ."
interest be alienable.

There is no requirement that such

Therefore, the decision of the trial court

with regard to dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien
cause of action on the ground that Defendant-Appellee's interest
in the property is not alienable should be reversed.
2.

Defendant-Appellee Hercules is an Owner of the Subject Property for the Purposes of the Utah Payment Bond Statutes, Utah
Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985).
Although the court below held that the interest of Defendant-

Appellee Hercules is not alienable and therefore not attachable by
a mechanic's lien, it also ruled that Defendant-Appellee Hercules'
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interest in the subject property was sufficient to qualify it as
an owner for the purposes of the payment bond statutes.

Since the

purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes is the
same, the ownership requirements should also be the same.
Throughout the case, Defendant-Appellee Hercules has argued
that it was not required to obtain a payment bond under Utah Code
Annotated

§§ 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) or 14-2-1 (1953 as

amended in 1965).
two theories.

This contention has been based upon at least

First, it was contended that Defendant-Appellee

Hercules is not an owner for purposes of the payment bond statute.
Second, it was contended that the material supplied by PlaintiffAppellant was not in connection with "the construction, addition
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure or improvement."

The first contention is discussed immediately hereafter

and the second is discussed in Section III. below.
Case

law does not support Defendant-Appellee Hercules'

proposition that it is not an owner for purposes of the payment
bond statute.

The duty of obtaining a payment bond is upon

ff

'[t]he owner of any interest in land' who enters into a contract

to construct an improvement thereon."

King Bros., Inc. v. Utah

Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 19 (Utah 1968) (Emphasis in Original)
(Ownership

of building

in which

installation was made was

sufficient for Utah's bond statute to apply).

The word land is a

generic term which includes not only the soil, but everything
attached to it by the course of nature, or by the hand of man,
such

as buildings,

fixtures, and
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fences.

Id..

"This is

particularly true with respect to these lien [and bond] statutes
which should be liberally construed to effect their purposes." Id.
The defendant in King Bros., Id., claimed that the payment bond
statute did not apply since it claimed an interest only in the
building and not in the underlying land.

The Utah Supreme Court

disagreed however by stating:
The difficulty with the Defendant's position
seems to be in the misapprehension that in
order for the statute to be applicable the
owner-builder must have an interest in the
freehold itself, that is the "soil" which
underlies the building, as distinguished from
the broader concept of the "realty" which is
improved. This is not an indispensable
requirement. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has also allowed mechanic's liens to
attach to interests less than fee simple, such as equitable
interests, leasehold interests and a building separate from the
soil upon which it was erected:
[A] building placed [on realty] should properly be regarded as part of the realty, and it
therefore follows that the defendant of
necessity must own some 'interest in the
land.' Id.
See also Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d
517 (1957); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382
(Utah 1982); and Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d
395, 464 P.2d 386 (1970).
Thus, any interest in the property

subjects the person

authorizing the work to the provisions of the Utah mechanic's lien
and payment bond statutes.

Because Hercules has an interest in

the property pursuant to the Facilities Use Agreement between
21

itself and the United States Navy, Utah's payment bond and
mechanic's lien statutes apply and, therefore, Defendant-Appellee
Hercules should be held personally liable for the debt incurred
for the materials supplied by Plaintiff-Appellant to the office
complexes.
Furthermore, Utah law does not permit suppliers to be bound
to the terms of lease agreements which work to avoid the bonding
statute and to which they were not parties and of whose contents
they had no knowledge.

Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of

Commerce, 395 P. 2d 914 (Utah 1964) (Leaseholder of building
subject to Utah's bond statute).

Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant should

not be restricted in its remedies as a result of an agreement
between

Defendant-Appellee

Hercules

and

the United

States

Government to which Plaintiff-Appellant was not a party nor of
which it had any knowledge.

Allowing otherwise could result in

easy circumvention of the statutes whose purpose clearly is to
protect suppliers.

IdL at 915.

Plaintiff-Appellant, as a supplier of materials and supplier
to Space Building Systems, had no way of knowing the arrangements
between Space Building Systems, Modulaire, Hercules and the United
States Government.

Furthermore, it does not depart from good

sense to assume that one who is paying thousands of dollars, even
hundreds of thousands, for improvements to property had some
interest in the property upon which the structure was situated.
King Bros., 440 P.2d at 18.
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In recent years, it is even more apparent that the Utah
legislature
broadly.
Annotated

intends that the ownership requirement be read
In 1987, the Utah legislature

amended Utah Code

§ 14-2-1 to include the definition of an "owner."

Subsection (l)(b) reads, "'Owner1 means any person contracting for
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or
improvement upon land."
Thus,

the trial court's ruling that

Defendant-Appellee

Hercules is an owner for the purposes of the payment bond statute
should be upheld and the mechanic's lien of Plaintiff-Appellant
should be held to have attached to the interest of Hercules in and
to the subject property.
III. THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT SUPPORT THE
LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICE COMPLEXES ARE PERSONAL
PROPERTY WHICH HAS NOT BECOME AFFIXED TO THE PROPERTY; THE
OFFICE COMPLEXES CONSTRUCTED BY MODULAIRE FOR HERCULES ARE
AFFIXED TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY DUE TO THE TYPE AND
MAGNITUDE OF THE COMPLEXES
The purpose of Utah mechanic's lien statute is to provide
protection to those who enhance the value of property by supplying
labor or materials.

Interiors Contracting, Inc.

P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982).

The statute is liberally and broadly

construed to effect this desired objective.
v.

Raintree

Development,

v. Navalco, 648

714 P.2d

Id*' AAA Fencing Co.

289, 291

(Utah

1986).

Defendant-Appellee Hercules' contentions and the trial court's
rulings are not in harmony with this principle.
The heart of Defendant-Appellee's argument, and the basis for
the trial court's decision regarding whether the work on the
office complexes is covered by the Utah payment bond statute, Utah
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Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985), is that
pursuant to Mueller v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279
(Utah 1982),

the office complexes are not fixtures to real

property and therefore not covered by the bonding statute.

In

Mueller, Cache Valley Dairy contracted with Maxum Corporation to
install

a whey

drying

system

on Cache's premises.

Maxum

subcontracted with Mueller and Dahle to install portions of the
system.

Cache paid a separate contractor to erect a prefabricated

metal building on Cache's premises to house the system.

Maxum was

paid in full by Cache for the system and declared bankruptcy
leaving Mueller unpaid.
to foreclose.

Mueller filed a mechanic's lien and sued

The Utah Supreme Court held against Mueller stating

that the building was constructed to house the system much in the
same way many buildings are constructed to house farm machinery;
further, the machinery had nothing to do with servicing the
building such as furnace and duct work.

Id. at 1284.

In reaching

this decision, a tripartite test was applied to distinguish
between real and personal property for mechanic's lien purposes:
(1) the manner in which the item is attached or annexed to realty;
(2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular use of the
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make the item a
permanent part of the realty.
Before discussing each element of the test, it must be noted
that the Mueller case is distinguishable from the present case.
Rather than equating the whey drying equipment to the office
complexes, the more appropriate analogy is with the prefabricated
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metal building assembled to house the equipment.

The prefabricat-

ed metal structure was chosen by Cache specifically because of its
"versatility."

Mueller at 1284.

"It's a construction which is

bolted together, it's very easily unbolted, and it provides
maximum flexibility . . . ." Id. at 1284-85.

Such flexibility

would also allow the prefabricated building to be transferred from
property

to property; yet, there was no mention that

prefabricated building was not lienable.

the

However, even though the

prefabricated building was easily removable, the Court found that
the manlift and walkway attached to the building were fixtures,
at 1283, 1285.

Thus, the prefabricated building had to qualify as

lienable work in order for the manlift and walkway to be lienable
as fixtures attached to the prefabricated building.

Plaintiff-

Appellant's supplies and materials are likewise incorporated into
Defendant-Appellee Hercules' office complexes.
Further, in the case at bar, the office complexes are
attached to sewer, water, electrical and telephone lines; the
wheels and hitches are removed; there is approximately 25,000
square

feet of office

space

in the complexes; the office

complexes, costing nearly one half million dollars, are situated
on the property supported by cinder blocks resting on concrete or
wooden pads and have been so situated for nearly four years; site
preparation

such as grading

and trenching was performed to

accommodate the office complexes; large paved parking lots either
adjoin and/or abut and conform to the office complexes' skirting
as if molded to the skirting and extends halfway up the skirting
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in certain areas; concrete sidewalks and stairways with steel
railings are erected to service the office complexes; the office
complexes are joined together by heavy metal, bolts, wiring, and
finish work, forming lengthy corridors; an enclosed, suspended
walkway was constructed promoting access to an otherwise separate
office building, enlarging the already lengthy corridors; and
interior stairwells promote access to terraced offices units.
Trial Exhibits 1 through 63 and 80 through

117.

See

See also

Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux and Exhibit 1 thereto — R . at 405.
Pursuant to the purpose and broad interpretation of the
mechanic's lien statue, the only legal conclusion one can properly
draw is that these office complexes are fixtures for the purposes
of the payment bohd and mechanic's lien statutes.
conclusion based upon these facts is in error.
Appellant

Any other

Thus, Plaintiff-

is entitled to judgment against Defendant-Appellee

Hercules for failure to obtain a bond.
It

is

ironic

that

under

Defendant-Appellee

Hercules'

argument, and under the logic adopted by the trial court, those
installing the underground utilities for the office complexes
(i.e., sewer, water, power) and those installing the concrete
walkways and asphalt parking surface would likely have failure to
obtain a bond and mechanic's lien claims, but those who did the
primary work, including Plaintiff-Appellant, upon which all the
other work depended would have no such rights.

See First of

Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assoc, 600 P.2d 521
(Utah 1979).
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Defendant-Appellee should not be allowed to circumvent the
clear purpose of the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes,
which purpose is to protect those who perform work and supply
material, such as Plaintiff-Appellant, by arguing the possibility
that the Offices will be removed or are taxed as personal
property.

Removability

and

taxability

effectiveness of a mechanic's lien.

do not

deter

the

Sanford v. Kunkel, 85 P. 363

(Utah 1906) (mechanic's lien effective though house moved from one
lot to another); Thorp Finance Corp. v. F.M. Wright, 399 P.2d 206,
207-08

(Utah 1965) (house trailer type structures not motor

vehicles though taxed as such); In re Wiley, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d
11 (1958) (mobile home fixed to real property though taxed as
personal property).

With modern equipment and ingenuity even

brick buildings are moveable.
1980).

Heath v. Parker, 604 P.2d 818 (N.M.

"To stretch a dwelling, wheel-less and motorless into a

'motor vehicle' would be akin to saying that moving a furnished
four or five-room house over the roads of Utah would make it a
'motor vehicle.'" Thorp Finance Corp. v. F.M. Wright, 399 P.2d
206, 207-08 (Utah 1965).
Case law and commentaries support

Plaintiff-Appellant's

position that the office complexes are covered by the payment bond
statute and are subject to mechanic's liens.

Concerning whether a

mobile home is a building, the Court in Commonwealth v. DePriest,
77 Montg. 11 (Pa. C.P. 1959) held that a mobile home 46 feet by
eight feet with wheels removed, resting on cinder block piers, and
connected to electric, water and telephone service lines was a
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"building" and permitted its use as a single family detached
dwelling.

Because a building on land is generally considered to

be part of the realty, the burden of proof is upon the party who
claims that the building is personal property to show that it
retains that character.

35 Am.Jur.2d, Fixtures, § 78 (1974).

To be considered part of the realty, a building need not be
physically anchored to the land.
skids suffice.

The force of gravity alone or

Rinaldi v. Poller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451

(1957); 35 Am.Jur.2d,

Fixtures § 78 (1974).

Frame buildings

resting on blocks or stones, or partly on the ground and partly on
posts or blocks are fixtures.
(1974).

35 Am. Jur.2d,

Fixtures § 35

In re Wiley, supra, held that a mobile home mounted on

cinder blocks and two by four timbers, connected with the city
sewer and water lines, and being used as and containing all the
attributes of a dwelling was fixed to the real property.
Determining that mobile homes are permanently attached to the
land, the court in Coyle Assessment, 17 Pa. D&C 2d 149 (1958),
upheld, for real property taxation purposes, an assessment against
three mobile homes which had been jacked up, wheels removed, and
set upon concrete blocks and pieces of timber.
water,

sewage, and electrical

connections

They each had

and abutted

upon

concrete floors or patios.

In distinguishing permanence from

transitoriness,

necessary

perpetuality.

it

is not

to

identify

it with

Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451,

453-54 (1957).
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To state that the office complexes are not affixed to the
land is to fictionalize reality.

The above facts and case law

evidence that the office complexes were intended to be and are
affixed to the realty.

Because the office complexes are on cinder

block columns resting on concrete or wooden pads does not alter
their affixed nature; prior case law has made that decision.
Surely the Defendants did not place office complexes costing
nearly one half million dollars on such a foundation believing
such to be insufficient.
on such a foundation

Indeed, the office complexes have been

for nearly

four years.

These office

complexes contain all the modern office conveniences such as
electricity, sewer, telephone and water hook-ups; a large asphalt
parking area; concrete sidewalks; interior stairways; and a lease
permitting

indefinite use, even purchase, should Defendant-

Appellant Hercules desire.

The possibility that Hercules may

choose to "un-affix" the office complexes at some point in the
future is irrelevant in determining the current status of the
office complexes.
Construing the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes
liberally to protect suppliers as required by Utah law, the facts
of this case require a legal conclusion that the office complexes
are fixtures and are, therefore, covered by the payment bond and
mechanic's lien statutes.
While

Plaintiff-Appellant

does

not

believe

that

the

tripartite test of Mueller should apply to large structures such
as these office complexes, and urges the Court to so hold, the
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Mueller test, discussed below, reinforces Plaintiff-AppellantTs
position.

The Mueller test involves 1) annexation, 2) adaptation,

and 3) intention of permanency.
1.

Annexation.
Defendants argue that because the office complexes are

removable, they, like the equipment in Mueller, are not affixed to
real property.
building

Removing equipment from the prefabricated metal

in Mueller

is much

different

than

prefabricated metal building from the real property.

removing

the

As mentioned

previously, the prefabricated, versatile building is far more like
the office complexes than the whey drying equipment.
issue

is annexation

of

Where the

large buildings or structures, the

tripartite Mueller test should not apply.

Removability of such

buildings or structures should not alter the validity of payment
bond claims or mechanic's liens resulting from the improvement of
the property by the erection of the building or structure.

The

materials and supplies incorporated by Defendants into the Offices
are analogous to the manlift and walkways in Mueller which were
considered fixtures and which gave rise to a mechanic' s lien in
favor of those who supplied and installed them.
The cost to dismantle and remove the offices complexes, if
the Defendant-Appellee Hercules ever does this, is approximately
$21,600.
218;

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, p. 2 —

Trial

Exhibit

64, p. 2.

Accordingly,

removability seems highly exaggerated.

R. at

the ease of

The office complexes are

hooked together, by bolts, metal beams, drywall, carpet, ceiling
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tile and track, and, in some locations, interior partition walls.
Exterior siding, interior stairways, a suspended walkway and
finish work overlapping Office connections must be destroyed to
allow removal.

Electrical, sewer, telephone and other power lines

extending from unit to unit or from complex to complex require
removal and would be useless without the presence of the office
complexes.
In addition to the costs stated above, following possible
removal, if any, the real property will be damaged in that actual
underground utility improvements are on the land and connected to
the office complexes, a massive asphalt parking lot with asphalt
extending nearly halfway up the skirting in certain areas will be
left behind, concrete sidewalks with steel railings will remain
and the property will retain the grading improvements made
specifically

for the trailers.

(Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux,

Exhibit 1).

All of these improvements will be left behind upon

removal, if any, and will also require removal if the land is to
be used other than for the office complexes.

Furthermore, the

absence of the office complexes will leave large unpaved holes in
the asphalt of the parking lot and the utility stub-outs will
remain.

See photographs marked as Trial Exhibits showing effect

of removal of another office complex, Annex 9.
2.

Adaptation.
At the motions for summary judgment and at the trial of the

case, Defendant-Appellee

Hercules argued that there was no

adaptation because the property was vacant and adaptable to
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various

uses.

Apparently,

Defendant-Appellee

Hercules

is

referring to the property's status before the office complexes
became affixed.

"Adaption occurs when personal property is

integrated into real property in furtherance of a specific purpose
to which the real property has been devoted.
1283-84.

. . ."

Mueller, at

The specific purpose of the property in the instant case

was and is to support Defendant-Appellee Hercules in the production of certain goods for the United States Government, such as to
accommodate the office complexes at issue herein.
Chilton

Leach,

Exhibit

3) See

State

Pauanikolas, 427 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1967).

Road

(Affidavit of
Commission

v.

The site was prepared

specifically for the office complexes, grading and trenching were
performed, concrete sidewalks and stairs with stee^l railings were
installed and the various utilities described above were prepared.
(Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, p. 4 ) .

Under Defendant-

Appellee Hercules' unrealistic argument, no office building would
ever be adapted if constructed on a previously vacant lot.
3.

Intent.
The

intention of the real property owner

is the most

important factor of the tripartite test for traditional personal
property.

Mueller.

at 1284.

While the stated

intent of

Defendant-Appellee Hercules is that these were intended to be
temporary, the facts belie that assertion.

The office complexes

were obtained for an initial period of two years.

However, this

had nothing to do with the expected duration of these office
complexes, but was determined by an internal policy of Defendant32

Appellee Hercules.

Trial Transcript, pp. 58 & 59.

The office

complexes have been retained by Defendant-Appellee Hercules under
the extension provisions of the purchase order through at least
the time of briefing.
The intent stated by Defendant-Appellee Hercules is not
persuasive

because

the

documentary

evidence

presented

by

Defendants is a far better indication of the parties' intent than
the self-serving, after-the-fact statements made in the affidavits
of Chilton Leach and Ryder Christian Waring and the testimony of
Ryder Christian Waring at the trial.

In the present case, the

Purchase Order between Defendant-Appellee Hercules and Defendant
Modulaire allows for purchase options and lease extension terms
beyond the initial period.
Furthermore, even if there is a finding that the parties to
the purchase order did have some serious notion about the removal
of the office complexes, that does not govern.

The intent of the

parties is only one factor in the analysis.

Certainly, where

there are office complexes of the size and magnitude involved in
this case, the presumption should be toward a finding that the
buildings or structures are affixed.

This coupled with the

previous analysis that the office complexes were annexed and
adapted to the property weigh in favor of a finding that the
office complexes are fixtures or improvements to the land.
The office complexes have been on the land for nearly four
years.

The purchase order, which Defendant-Appellee Hercules

contends evidences the intent to make the office complexes a non33

permanent part of the real property, is entitled "Purchase Order,"
contains a "buy option," and provides an option for Hercules to
extend the lease for, apparently, an indefinite period of time
with rental payments not to exceed those originally in effect.
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 —

R. at 217.

As a matter of policy, to place too much emphasis on the
issue of intent for purposes of determining whether property
becomes a fixture invites abuse and after-the-fact protectionism
by owners declaring that the property was intended to be temporary
from the outset.

Under Defendant-Appellee's urged reading of the

Mueller test, a person would be able to defeat the bond and lien
rights of those working on traditional construction projects.

All

the owner would have to do is to declare that the building was
intended to be temporary.
Such a result would not be proper in that situation and it is
not proper in the present case.
CONCLUSION
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed
to protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for
projects such as the office complexes built for Defendant-Appellee
Hercules.

Defendant-Appellee Hercules holds and interest in and

to the subject property which

is sufficient

Appellant's mechanic's lien to attach.

for Plaintiff-

Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the
trial

court

at summary

judgment

by reinstating

Plaintiff-

Appellant's mechanic's lien cause of action against the subject
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property and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of
that mechanic's lien.
Further, based upon the policy underlying the mechanic's lien
and

payment

bond

statutes, and based

upon the

facts

and

circumstances presented at the motions for summary judgement and
at the trial of the case, the office complexes became affixed to
the subject real property.

This is the only legal conclusion

which can be properly drawn from the facts presented.

Therefore,

Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision of the trial court following the trial of the case by
reinstating Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to obtain a bond cause
of action and remand the case for a determination as to the amount
of the judgment.
DATED this 17th day of April, 1989.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
/

(/

/

J I l ( -..rr

By: V^^;^-^-;-—~r- L~^<^
-^^
Darrel J. Bostwick
Attorneys-for PlaintiffAppellant
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985)
14-2-1.

Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.

The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract,
involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition to,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement
upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from
the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with
good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material
furnished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed
under the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other
persons as their interest may appear.
Any person who has
furnished or rented any equipment or materials ,or performed labor
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for
which payment has not been made, has a direct right of action
against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of
the rented materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable
value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40
days after the completion, abandonment, or default in the
performance of the work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon
request.
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation
of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon.
Actions to recover on such liability shall be
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials
were furnished or the labor performed.
14-2-3.

Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen Attorneyf s fee.

In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
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14-2-4.

Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees.

Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a mortgage
or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to obtain the
bond described in § 41-2-1, or imposes any liability upon a
mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained such a
bond.

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1987)
14-2-1.
(1)

Definitions - Payment bond required - Right of ActionNotice.
For purposes of this chapter:

(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be awarded a
contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any
building, structure, or improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for construction,
alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement
upon land.
(2) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or
improvement upon land is awarded to any contractor, the owner
shall obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with
Subsection (3), which shall become binding upon the award of the
contract to the contractor.
(3)
The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all persons
supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price.
(4) (a) Any person who has furnished labor of material in
the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract, in
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this chapter,
and who has not been paid in full therefor within 90 days after
the day on which the last of the labor was performed by him or
material was supplied by him for which the claim is made, may sue
on the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is
filed and may prosecute the action for the amount due him. Any
person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor,
but no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing
the payment bond, has a right of action upon the payment bond upon
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days from the
date on which such person performed the last of the labor or
supplied the last of the material for which the claim is made.
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The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the
name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the
material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered
or certified mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor at any place
the contractor maintains an office of conducts business.
(b) Any suit instituted under this section shall be brought in
the district court of any county in which the contract was to be
performed, and not elsewhere. No such suit may be commenced after
the expiration of one year after the day on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person. The
obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party in the
suit.
(5) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested
person upon request.
14-2-2.

Failure of owner to obtain payment bond - Liability.

Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to all
persons who have performed labor or have supplied materials under
the contract for the reasonable value of the labor performed or
materials furnished. No action to recover on such liability may
be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on
which the last of the labor was performed or the material was
supplied by such person.

Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981)
38-1-3.

Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on
ores mined.

Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon
the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
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attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the
property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises included within the lease.
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